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On January 30, 1984, the Arkansas Supreme 
Court acknowledged that it had "inadvertently 
failed to recognize the new concept of ' marital prop-
erty' " created by a 1979 Arkansas statute, and 
awarded to Sarah Day one half of her ex-husband's 
interest in his employer-sponsored retirement plan. 
The scenario which led to this decision in Day v. 
Day, 281 Ark. 261, 663 S.W.2d 719 (1984), is 
certainly not unique. Dr. Stephen Martin Day and 
Sarah Shinault Day were married for twenty-nine 
years and had six children. The only contested issue 
when Sarah Day brought suit for a divorce was the 
division ofthe marital property. The divorce decree 
directed the husband to pay alimony for twenty-
four months and child support for the only remain-
ing minor child, with all other property to be di-
vided equally between the parties. Included within 
this equal division of property was Stephen Day's 
interest in a retirement plan sponsored by his em-
ployer, the University of Arkansas at Fayetteville. 
Under an act passed in 1979 governing the di-
vision of marital property, all "marital property" is 
subject to equitable distribution upon divorce. 
"Marital property" is dermed simply as "all prop-
erty acquired by either spouse subsequent to the 
marriage," subject to certain limited exceptions: (1) 
property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or de-
scent; (2) property acquired in exchange for prop-
erty acquired prior to the marriage or in exchange 
for property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or de-
scent; (3) property acquired by a spouse after a 
decree of divorce from bed and board; (4) property 
excluded by valid agreement of the parties; and (5) 
any increase in value of property acquired prior to 
the marriage. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1214 (Supp. 
1983). The Court found, as the parties acknowl-
47 
edged, that none of the designated exceptions were 
applicable to Dr. Day's retirement accounts. 
Dr. Day's retirement plan consisted of two an-
nuity contracts - a guaranteed deferred annuity 
contract (administered by the Teachers' Insurance 
Annuity Association) and a variable annuity plan 
(the College Retirement Equities Fund), known col-
lectively as the "TIAA-CREF" plan. Dr. Day par-
ticipated in the plan by making monthly contri-
butions of 10% of his salary which the University 
matched in equal contributions. Earnings on the 
pension funds' investments would be credited to his 
account. His interest in the plan was "vested" only 
in the sense that it could not be diminished uni-
laterally by the University and was not dependent 
on his continued employment by the University. He 
was not entitled to payments at the time of the 
decree, so the interest was not "vested" in that 
sense. He could have elected to receive his periodic 
benefits at any time but had not done so at the time 
of the decree. Moreover, he could not withdraw or 
transfer the funds to his credit, those funds having 
no loan or surrender value, and he could not receive 
his benefits in a lump sum. Sarah Day had been 
awarded half of the accumulated value of his in-
terest in the plan, to be awarded to her when Dr. 
Day should elect to receive payments. Any contri-
butions made by Dr. Day after the date of the di-
vorce decree would accrue only to his benefit. 
In several Arkansas Supreme Court cases de-
cided under an earlier version of the property set-
tlement statute and under the 1979 act, the Court 
had concluded that similar benefits were not prop-
erty subject to equitable distribution upon divorce 
because they were dependent on future contingen-
cies or not yet due and payable. Under an earlier 
version of the statute (Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1214 
(Repl. 1962», the Court had found that fully vested 
railroad retirement benefits not yet due and pay-
able (Knopfv. Knopf, 264 Ark. 946, 576 S.W.2d 193 
(1979» and military retirement pay not yet due and 
payable (Fenney v. Fenney, 259 Ark. 858, 537 
S.W.2d 367 (1970» were not property subject to 
distribution. Under the 1979 act, the Court had 
refused to fmd a military pension being paid but 
non-transferable to be marital property (Paulsen v. 
Paulsen, 269 Ark. 523, 601 S.W.2d 873 (1980». Sim-
ilarly, in other divorce cases, the Court had rejected 
property claims to company retirement benefits 
(Sweeney v. Sweeney, 267 Ark. 595,593 S.W.2d 21 
(1980», a capital account not fully distributable 
(Hachett u. Hachett, 278 Ark. 82, 643 S.W.2d 560 
(1982», see also Russell v. Russell, 275 Ark. 193, 
628 S.W.2d 315 (1982), and an IRA account notfully 
distributable (Potter u. Potter, 280 Ark. 38, 655 
S.W.2d 382 (1983)). In contrast, however, the Court 
had held that a profit-sharing trust subject to the 
employee's withdrawal was marital property 
(Bachman v. Bachman, 274 Ark. 23,621 S.W.2d 
701 (1981». 
What, then, led the Court to conclude that Dr. 
Day's retirement benefits were marital property, 
prompting Justice Hickman to remark in dissent 
that he assumed the "traditional approach" of 
Hackett> Russell, Bachman> Paulsen, Sweeney, and 
Knopf was overruled? The Court concluded: 
Under the recent holdings of the Supreme 
Court, spouses must be treated equally in the 
absence of a valid reason for making a dis-
tinction. Our 1979 law was enacted pursuant 
to that mandate and must be construed in 
harmony with that intent. It is easy to dem-
onstrate that the legislative purpose will be 
frustrated if controlling differences are drawn 
between pensions vested and currently pay-
able and those that are vested but payable in 
the future. If, for example, Dr. Day had made 
a monthly deposit in a savings account for 20 
years, that money would be marital property 
in a divorce case. The same rule would apply 
if, a year before the divorce, he had in good 
faith decided to invest the money in an an-
nuity payable upon his future retirement. His 
interest in the annuity would also be marital 
property. That in substance is the situation in 
this case: Dr. Day has used part of the family's 
money to buy the annuities he now seeks to 
exempt from their proper classification as 
marital property. Under the law, however, we 
must recognize that Mrs. Day also contributed 
to the acquisition of the annuities by service 
as a homemaker and by bearing the six chil-
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dren and bringing them up. 
To buttress its conclusion, the Court quoted with 
approval the California Supreme Court decision in 
Re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal.3d 838, 126 Cal.Rptr. 
633,544 P.2d 561, 94 A.L.R.3d 164 (1976), a deci-
sion defining community property. In refusing to 
find "controlling differences" between pensions 
"vested" and currently payable and those "vested" 
but payable in the future, the Arkansas Supreme 
Court was apparently using the term ''vested'' in 
the sense used in Brown - that the pension ben-
efits could not be unilaterally terminated by the 
employer without terminating the employment re-
lationship: 
Having concluded that Dr. Day's pension rights 
were property, the Court went one step further to 
determine that the pension created rights which 
were subject to division as marital property, rather 
than merely factors to be considered in the award 
of alimony. If the pension benefits had been viewed 
only as factors militating in favor of increased al-
imony, Stephen Day would have been obliged to 
pay alimony in an amount commensurate with in-
come he was not actually receiving. Then Sarah 
Day would not have been able to retain the option 
of allowing the benefits awarded to her to continue 
to accumulate in the fund on a tax deferred basis. 
The Court was unwilling to reach that result in the 
circumstances of the case. However, the Court cau-
tioned that it was not setting forth an inflexible 
rule, and left the characterization of other deferred 
benefit plans to future cases.1 
Will the Day case, then, lead to the classification 
of social security benefits, insurance benefits, and 
military pensions as "marital property?" The dis-
sent suggests so. The distinguishing features of the 
TIAA-CREF accounts were that they were: (1) pur-
chased with marital funds; (2) vested from termi-
nation by the employer without termination of the 
employment relationship; (3) subject to election to 
receive benefits at any time; (4) had a current, as-
certainable value, and (5) could be divided easily 
and equitably. In future cases, any deviations in 
benefit plans from these characteristics could be 
used by the Court to refuse division of the plan as 
marital property. 
For example, military retirement pay bears cer-
tain similarities to ordinary pension plans for pe-
riodic benefits to be dispensed upon retirement but 
subject to divestment upon prior death or dis-
charge. On the other hand, military retirement pay 
at no time has any cash surrender, loan, redemp-
tion or lump sum value and, more importantly, pen-
sions may be eliminated or reduced by the govern-
ment. The division of insurance benefits as marital 
property would be entirely dependent on the nature 
of the plan, with the inascertainable current value 
and dependency on future contingencies inherent 
in most plans militating against equitable division 
as marital property, although the present cash sur-
render value and paid-in cash premiums of some 
insurance plans may be considered in the property 
settlement. Social Security benefits as a form of 
social insurance differ in several respects from or-
dinary pension plans subject to division as marital 
property: inter alia, the amount of an employee's 
contributions does not necessarily determine the 
amount of benefits received, the amount of benefits 
is subject to adjustment based upon future conduct 
having nothing to do with contributions or past la-
bor, and the family portion of benefits is predicated 
upon the status of the recipient of the benefits 
rather than the covered worker's contributions (see, 
e.g., In Re Marriage of Kelley, 64 Cal. App.3d 82, 
134 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1976)). 
The Pandora's box which the dissent projects, 
therefore, may be one that is easily manageable 
within the criteria of the Day case and those of 
other jurisdictions which also have embarked along 
this same route.2 The dissent might view as even 
more troublesome another potential form of "mar-
ital property" the Arkansas Supreme Court has yet 
to address - the professional degree in a marriage 
in which there are no other appreciable assets. 
When there are appreciable assets during a mar-
riage, a spouse's financial contributions toward the 
other spouse's degree may be considered in division 
of the assets, yet when the only marital asset is a 
degree in the name of one spouse who has been , 
supported during the earning of the degree by the 
other spouse, traditional concepts of property may 
preclude an equitable remedy. In such circumstan-
ces, courts frequently will consider the professional 
spouse's future earning capacity or the contributing 
spouse's contributions as "breadwinner" in deter-
mining the property settlement or alimony. Does 
such an approach assure the contributing spouse a 
fair return on his or her investment in the degree? 
What should be done if the statute precludes ali-
mony to a spouse capable of self-support? As can 
be seen from these questions, the Arkansas Su-
preme Court has taken only a preliminary step in 
Day toward defining property to assure equal treat-
ment of spouses upon divorce. 
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FOOTNOTES 
The author would like to thank Terry Kirkpatrick, counsel for 
Sarah Shinault Day, for her cooperation in the preparation of 
this commentary. 
1 Dr. Day also urged for reversal based upon the purported 
negative tax consequences to hlm of the decree, but he had failed 
to preserve or develop the issue below. The Court did, however, 
amend the decree to reserve jurisdiction for any tax problems 
that might arise. 
2 Valuation of pension rights is also a manageable task. The 
approach of the courts has been: (1) to award the spouse a por-
tion of the employee's contributions to the fund; (2) calculate 
the present value of the benefits payable in the future, dis· 
counted to present value by the amount of interest to be earned 
in the future, by the probability that the employee will die before 
qualifying for full rights or by any other condition whlch might 
disqualify the employee; or (3) to determine a flXed percentage 
for the nonemployee spouse of any future payments the em-
ployee receives as was done in Day. 
